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The fate of empiricism in the period between middle of the eighteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century (that is, between the sceptical naturalism of David Hume and the inductivism 
of John Stuart Mill) presents a curious episode that rarely attracts comment. Around a century 
ago, Leslie Stephen and Élie Halévy depicted this period as merely a lull or hiatus in British 
intellectual history, one in which the collective attention of philosophers was directed towards 
thinking through the consequences of the French Revolution. Halévy, for example, claimed that 
between David Hartley and James Mill, English thought passed ‘through a period of standstill’ 
(Halévy 434). Against this view, I will argue here that English—or, more accurately, British 
thought—did not so much stand still as switch paradigms, at least for a period. This change is 
evident in two developments: the socialisation of experience by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
and the impact of belletristic periodical culture upon philosophical discourse. These two factors 
were linked in ways that produced a remarkable turn in the relationship between philosophy and 
literature between the publication of Hume’s Treatise in 1740 and the heyday of the Romantic 
familiar essay in the 1820s. Consequently, at least part of what Halévy registered as an absence is, 
in effect, a swerve away from systematic epistemology and towards a form of essayism, involving 
a corresponding change in philosophical style and vocabulary.  
 
In this essay, I explore these developments in more detail. I briefly outline the ways in 
which, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the idea of intersubjectivity emerged as a 
counterdiscourse to a scientific empiricism based upon the epistemological binary of subject and 
object and the correspondence theory of truth. Driven by a Scottish insistence that society 
precedes rationality, and exemplified by Hume’s idea of an ‘easy,’ conversational philosophy, 
empiricism was regrounded in social correspondence rather than epistemological 
correspondence; above all, it based itself in the circulation of trust and the kinds of performances 
that reinforced that trust. As economies of knowledge were increasingly linked to the 
maintenance of certain (trustworthy) forms of social behaviour, the epistemological stakes were 
raised for communicative acts in general, and for literary works in particular.  
 
Since the days of The Spectator, the familiar essay had functioned as the literary genre of 
trusting intersubjectivity par excellence, a vehicle for philosophical experiments in communication.  
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And yet, Hume’s treatment of trust was more radical than that of his Augustan precursors, 
raising the stakes for the essayistic performance. Only with Hume’s conventionalist treatment of 
rationality did it become possible for empiricism to accommodate the idea that truth presupposes 
communication and that subjectivity itself is constructed relationally, via interactions with others. 
In the final section of the essay, I will suggest that, while Hume’s language game of proto-
pragmatic essayism is continued in the Romantic familiar essay, the strategy for promoting 
intersubjectivity changed in the early nineteenth century. Where the rewards of essaying for 
Hume lay in the consolidation of consensus through philosophically indifferent conversation, for 
a Romantic essayist such as Lamb, they consisted in the promotion of solidarity through the 
production of transcendence and re-enchantment. 
 
Hume’s ‘easy’ empiricism 
 
The idea that Hume promoted a form of empiricism based upon trust and intersubjective 
consensus will inevitably strike many as counterintuitive. Some might even claim that Hume was 
the least trusting of all Enlightenment thinkers. It was Hume, after all, who wrote in the Treatise of 
Human Nature that ‘[n]o weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what 
we commonly call Credulity, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others […]’ (112)—a remark 
that foreshadowed his celebrated attack on testimonial evidence in the ‘Essay on Miracles’. 
Certainly, the sceptical part of Hume’s thought is not in dispute. By arguing that all our ideas are 
either ‘copy'd from our impressions’ (72) or made up of simple ideas that are themselves derived from 
impressions, Hume picks at a loose thread in Locke’s account of cognition. By the time he has 
finished pulling at this thread, he has completely unravelled the idea of causation, since ‘from the 
mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there will never arise any new original 
idea, such as that of a necessary connexion […]’ (88). Nor does this unwinding of knowledge end 
with causation. Ultimately, belief itself is shown to rest upon nothing more substantial than 
sentiment: the ‘force and vivacity’ communicated by an impression to an idea, which ‘super-adds 
nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner of conceiving it […]’ (101). Nonetheless, as 
Hume concedes later in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, one cannot live one’s life as a 
sceptic: ‘Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning 
whatsoever’ (41).  
It is because of this caveat that Hume’s arguments in the Treatise have carried an air of 
paradox for many readers. As Kenneth Richman notes, ‘Hume appears to do the following: (a) 
endorse beliefs in objects and causes, (b) hold that we should not endorse beliefs that do not 
3 
 
have appropriate grounding in our impressions [...] and (c) hold that the beliefs in objects and 
causes do not have appropriate grounding of our impressions’ (Richman 3). One result of this 
paradox is a split between what Richman calls ‘Old’ Humeans and ‘New’ Humeans. 
Commentators of the former persuasion, such as Stephen and Halévy, tend to downplay position 
(a) and emphasise (b) and (c). Accordingly, such ‘sceptical’ readings of Hume tend to see his 
impressionism as exhaustively phenomenalistic. According to this view, Hume’s sceptical attack 
on representationalism and the ‘correspondence’ model of truth signals the bankruptcy of an 
abstracted, atomistic view of experience and meaning. Since the work of Norman Kemp Smith, 
however, there has been a tendency to downplay positions (b) and (c) and foreground (a). 
Following this line of interpretation, ‘New’ Humeans such as Annette Baier, Peter Jones and 
Donald Livingston see Hume’s impressionism as a manoeuvre whereby Hume exploded the 
hypostatised vocabulary of ideas and impressions in order to create a new language of experience 
based upon non-epistemological principles of feeling, habit and custom. From this perspective, 
Hume’s adoption and deconstruction of the language of ‘ideas’ is the first step in a process of 
redescription that restored the social, dialogical and experimental dimensions to ‘experience.’  
One virtue of such readings (though not one previously noted) is that they highlight the 
significance of the subtitle of the Treatise: ‘An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects.’ Hume’s very specific use of the term ‘experimental’ here is easily 
overlooked. Since Locke, empirical philosophy had entertained the idea of the mind as a forum 
for philosophical experimentation. For Hume, however, the laboratory for empirical experiment 
was not the mind as Locke’s camera obscura of abstracted consciousness, but something closer to 
mind in society. He makes this point quite explicitly in his Introduction to the Treatise when he 
cautions the reader that ‘[w]e must […] glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by 
men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures’ (xix). In this way, Hume effected a 
transition from a model of thought based upon pure induction and objectivity (i.e. upon an 
epistemological binary of subject / object) to one that was based upon sentiment and 
intersubjectivity. By downgrading ‘correspondence’ theories of truth and meaning, which generally 
viewed experience as a form of representation, he abandoned the Lockean image of punctual 
subjectivity: that is, one constituted by a manifold of atomised experiences (ideas and 
impressions), and underwritten by a providential rationality. In its place, Hume developed a 
model of ‘experience’ based in trial and experiment within a constitutive framework of social 
custom, sentiment, and most importantly, trust.i Trust became vital to Hume’s thought precisely 
because his sceptical approach left the human intellect with no other means of support than the 
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sentiment of belief, the manner in which the object is conceived. As Miriam Solomon argues, the 
lesson Hume derives from scepticism is that ‘knowledge requires more than reason and 
experience, not that knowledge is impossible’ (52). For Hume, radical scepticism led to social 
empiricism.  
 
The familiar essay as philosophical performance 
 
Thanks to Hume then, literary form became a philosophical issue. Interest in the regulation of 
trust by means of literary performances that consolidated social and epistemological norms 
engendered, in turn, a concern with the performative dimension of language as well as with the 
status and function of philosophical writing. In particular, the essay, with its amenability to 
tentative, unmethodical improvisation and friendly conversation, appeared to fit an image of 
reason based on the very ideas of custom, habit and sentiment presented in Hume’s picture of a 
decentred, constitutive intersubjectivity. Tellingly, as Hume abandoned representational 
empiricism in favour of ‘easy’ empiricism, he drew away from the systematic treatise and moved 
towards the familiar essay as the genre of philosophy.  
 
To an extent, Hume was walking a well-trodden path. Since the days of The Spectator and 
The Tatler, the periodical essay had functioned as both medium and model for the open, 
egalitarian and polite discursiveness of the public sphere. Addison and Steele had exploited the 
essay’s potential to move amphibiously across boundaries, between philosophical and literary 
modes of expression, as well as between academic and informal writing. Most notably, in The 
Spectator no. 10, Addison declared his intention to emulate Socrates, who ‘brought Philosophy 
down from Heaven, to inhabit among Men,’ by bringing ‘Philosophy out of Closets and 
Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, at Tea-tables, and in Coffee-
houses’ (44). In this way, essaying as an activity eschewed the quest for certainty in order to 
foster an idea of ‘experience’ very close to that outlined in the Introduction to Hume’s Treatise: 
an experimental activity in which the mind came to reshape itself through its engagement with 
human life in ‘the common course of the world.’ 
And yet, there is a vital difference between the essayism of Hume and that of Addison. 
For Addison, the Lockean subject remained intellectually punctual and intact. Consequently, 
despite his claim that the experimentalism of the familiar essay provided philosophy with a 
pathway from the cloisters of learning into the bright thoroughfare of the public sphere, Addison 
did not consider the possibility that the very customs, habits and conventions depicted in the 
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pages of The Tatler and The Spectator might themselves be epistemologically constitutive. The 
correspondence between ‘trust’ and ‘truth’ ran in one direction only: the former could, at most, 
only ever count as limited evidence for the latter. For Hume, however truth itself could not be 
separated from ‘common life and Conversation.’ Consequently, what one finds in the essays of 
Hume is a more radical socialisation of empiricism in the face of an intolerable but incorrigible 
epistemological scepticism. By replacing Locke’s providential, private and pictorial conception of 
human reason with a conventional, public and grammatical one, Hume implied that the truth of 
any empirical statement ultimately depended upon the manner of its performance and upon the 
‘sentiment’ attached to its conception. In foregrounding the performative function of 
philosophical language, Hume dramatically raised the stakes for the essayist as stylist. Put simply, 
manner became everything. 
 
It is this consciousness of the fundamentally performative nature of the philosophical 
writer’s task that distinguishes mid-century essayists such as Hume and Johnson from their 
Augustan predecessors. After Hume, the problem of empiricism’s relation to public discourse 
was no longer simply one of how philosophical thoughts might be curated and transmitted to the 
reading public, it was also one of how an empirical concept of ‘experience’ might itself be shaped 
by the conventions and practices of communication. In effect, Hume’s insistence that 
conversation forms a constitutive part of experience radicalised Addison’s project to socialise 
philosophy by placing intersubjectivity at the very core of human thought: while Addison and 
Steele brought philosophy to the ‘coffee-house’, Hume endeavoured to bring the ‘coffee-house’ 
to philosophy. 
 
Accordingly, Hume’s own essays attempted to police polite culture through 
performances of moderate scepticism. He developed an ‘easy,’ conversable empiricism that 
endeavoured to reinforce solidarity rather than demonstrate logical certainty. And yet, the very 
need to ‘reinforce’ trust indicated that trust had its limits. Hume’s technique as a writer 
incorporated the thought that these limits are not defined rationally, but through human second 
nature: through emotion, custom and habit. In this respect, Hume is the disciple of Cicero rather 
than Newton, deploying measured prose that asserts epistemic authority through its rhetoric of 
reasonableness and moderation, through its commanding exhibition of communicability. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the exemplary act of polite self-fashioning exhibited by his 
suitably brief autobiographical essay, ‘My Own Life,’ in which the reader encounters the persona 




To conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was (for that is the style I 
must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my 
sentiments); I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, 
social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and 
of great moderation in all my passions. (Essays xl) 
 
Here, the cardinal virtues of Hume’s Academic scepticism, of ‘mild dispositions, of command of 
temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour’, are revealed to be those of the author himself. 
Above all, the ‘moderation’ of the philosopher’s passions, which is itself reflected in the modesty 
of the self-representation Hume offers, typifies the philosophical attribute of ataraxia 
(detachment) required to live a civilized and enlightened life without epistemic grounds or 
foundations. This philosophical moderation lay at the heart of Hume’s essayism, insofar as the 
essay genre provided him with a literary analogue for the conversable world and an antidote to 
the philosophical enthusiasm of systematic, rationalist philosophy. In this way, Hume used the 
familiar discourse of the essay to reposition epistemology, moving it away from what he saw as 
the ineffectual domains of truth and reason and into the active territory of public discourse, 
custom and opinion. By doing so, he relocated the philosophical authority of the man of letters 
from the foundations of truth to the circulation of trust. 
 
This meant that the essayist took on the role of a diplomat between the worlds of 
learning and polite conversation, or as Hume puts it in his unpublished essay ‘Of Essay-Writing’, 
as ‘a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of 
Conversation […]’: 
 
Learning has been as great a Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded 
from the World and good Company. By that Means, every Thing of what we call Belles 
Lettres became totally barbarous, being cultivated by Men without any Taste of Life or 
Manners, and without that Liberty and Facility of Thought and Expression, which can 
only be acquir’d by Conversation. Even Philosophy went to Wrack by this moaping 
recluse Method of Study, and became as chimerical in her Conclusions as she was 
unintelligible in her Stile and Manner of Delivery. And indeed, what cou’d be expected 
from Men who never consulted Experience in any of their Reasonings, or who never 
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search’d for that Experience, where alone it is to be found, in common Life and 
Conversation? (Essays 535). 
 
Once again, as Hume makes clear in this passage, experience cannot be separated from ‘common 
life and Conversation.’ The essayist, unlike the solitary scholar, adapts the ‘the higher and more 
difficult Operations of the Mind’ to ‘the easier and more gentle Exercises of the Understanding’ 
(Essays 533) not because (or not solely because) this helps him to communicate truth, but 
because it is only in such communication that truth ultimately lies.  
 
Sociability through re-enchantment: The Romantic familiar essay. 
 
What does the familiar essay’s shifting epistemological significance in the eighteenth century tell 
us about the development of the genre in the early nineteenth century? Essayists such as Lamb 
and Hazlitt inherited from Hume and Johnson a readiness to draw upon the performative 
resources of the familiar essay in order to imagine a shared community of opinion and belief. 
What distinguishes Romantic essayists from their predecessors, however, is the issue of what was 
at stake in the performance of essaying. For the latter, the language game engaged by the familiar 
essay necessitated that certain normative structures were presupposed. For Hume in particular, such 
structures were determined by custom and reinforced by the exhibition of courteous manners. In 
such cases, it was assumed that the reader could not fully appreciate the performance of the 
author without already sharing a great deal of their ‘common’ background of beliefs. In other 
words, what was epistemologically at stake for the Neoclassical familiar essayist was the status of 
a truth whose verifiability is fundamentally a practical and intersubjective affair. 
 
For the essayist of the early nineteenth century, however, the fiction of familiarity was 
beginning to wear thin. Indeed, perceptions of what was at stake in the literary performance of 
the essay had already begun to shift significantly by the end of the eighteenth century. Most 
notably, the political upheavals of the 1790s made the consolidation of imagined solidarity 
envisaged by Hume appear more nakedly politicised, recast by Burke as a call for national unity 
around feelings of familial partiality and prejudice. Moreover, the essayist now wrote for a 
marketplace that had expanded and diversified: as Jon Klancher and William St. Clair have 
documented, patronage and subscription had given way to contracts with booksellers, the 
periodical essay had been replaced by the magazine and the newspaper, and an increasingly 
productive printing press was undergoing its industrial revolution. This environment presented 
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the essayist with new challenges: it was difficult to consolidate ways of understanding the world 
when the common ground of good sense and precedent presupposed by Hume and Johnson had 
fragmented, polarised, or been discredited. Hume’s Ciceronian idea of literature as the domain of 
polite letters, courtly virtues and easy philosophising was overtaken by the Romantic notion of 
literature as, in Wordsworth’s phrase, ‘the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge […]’ (141). As 
social harmonies were exchanged for transcendental sublimities, the Romantic enactment of 
familiar conversation sought to establish a different relationship with readers, one based in the 
idealised grounds of singularity and enchantment.  
 
Consequently, the Romantic essayist’s primary task became one of establishing social and 
epistemological norms through the exercise of imaginative power. As writers sought new 
grounds for literary ‘truth’, the experimental maintenance and consolidation of intersubjective 
consensus was replaced by the experimental production and exploration of new intellectual 
territory. This shift is reflected in the changing persona of the essayist. While the individual 
figured in the prose identity of Hume presupposed an intersubjective conception of the speaking 
subject—one whose unity is held together by pragmatic, rather than by metaphysical, 
principles—in philosophical Romanticism, the unification of style and substance was 
underpinned by an ideal presence. Rather than seeking to reinforce consensuality, the subject 
invoked by the romantic familiar essay was one who searches, however unsuccessfully, for 
transcendental authentication. The persona of Lamb’s essayist, for instance, is constructed 
around the ironic and partial recuperation of a lost wholeness, often figured as a borderline, 
twilight territory of enchanted consciousness. ‘Imperfect Sympathies,’ with its digs at the moral 
philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, exemplifies this condition while explicitly opposing it 
to a ‘Scottish’ tradition of intellectualised intersubjectivity: 
 
I can look with no indifferent eye upon things or persons. […]. I am, in plainer words, a 
bundle of prejudices […]. There is an order of imperfect intellects (under which mine 
must be content to rank) which in its constitution is essentially anti-Caledonian. The 
owners of the sort of faculties I allude to, have minds rather suggestive than 
comprehensive. They have no pretences to much clearness or precision in their ideas, or 
in their manner of expressing them. Their intellectual wardrobe (to confess freely) has 
few whole pieces in it. They are content with fragments and scattered pieces of Truth. 
[…]. The light that lights them is not steady and polar, but mutable and shifting: waxing, 
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and again waning. […] They are no systematizers, and would but err more by attempting 
it. (58-59)  
 
Whether or not Lamb had Hume in mind as his model of the ‘Caledonian’ intellect, the 
‘systematizer’ label is one that the latter would have rejected, belying as it does his concern with 
folding the episteme of scientific knowledge into the doxa of social communication. Indeed, for 
Hume, as long as the credit supply of trust underpinning intersubjective consensus could be 
maintained, the metaphysical status of human belief need not be a pressing concern, still less one 
that called for systematization. The task of the essayist as an epistemological diplomat was to 
keep conversation going, and above all to keep such conversation polite and civilized. In 
‘Imperfect Sympathies,’ however, epistemological doubt itself becomes aestheticized into an 
ideal presence that can only be approached through imagination. Instead of seeking to 
consolidate assumed intersubjective consensus a la the ‘Caledonian’ constitution, Lamb’s ‘Elia’ 
essays endeavour to produce affective connections through a kind of exemplary performance of 
individuality. Elia offers to engage his reader in a language game based upon the celebration of 
whim, prejudice and singularity. The state of mind required for this game is precisely what the 
‘brain of a true Caledonian’ lacks, i.e. ‘misgivings, half-intuitions, semi-consciousnesses, partial 
illuminations, dim instincts, embryo conceptions.’ In this way, the aporia that caused Hume to 
abandon epistemology altogether is reified in Lamb as a borderline territory of re-enchantment: 
what Elia refers to as ‘[t]he twilight of dubiety’ (60). Whereas in Hume the protean nature of the 
familiar essay is utilized in the service of dialogue, in Lamb the essay’s shapelessness is itself 
aestheticized, offering to charm the reader rather than draw them into an imaginary 
conversation. Rather than being dedicated to the maintenance of everyday experience in the 
common course of the world, the essay’s liminality is redirected towards the recovery and 
transcendence of the ordinary through the thoroughly extraordinary performance of the essayist.  
 
 The differences between the two essayists should not be overstated. Like Hume, Lamb 
uses the conversational character of the familiar essay in order to conduct experiments in trust 
with his readers. What the persona of Elia offers in return for such trust, however, is not so 
much reassuring sociability as the possibility of the reader’s re-enchantment with the world. 
Indeed, in his essay ‘The Old Margate Hoy’ (1823), Elia introduces a figure who uncannily 
resembles the essayist himself. Recounting a sea trip upon the eponymous vessel during a 
miserable holiday to the south coast of England, Lamb describes one of his fellow passengers as 
‘the greatest liar I had met with then, or since,’ one who ‘plunged at once into the depths of your 
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credulity.’ This ‘Spanish complexioned young man’ tells tall tales of how he had served as Aid-
de-camp to a Persian prince, seen a phoenix in Egypt and sailed through the legs of the Colossus 
at Rhode. And yet, rather than inciting irritated incredulity, these stories offer a welcome respite 
from the tedium of the boat trip. More specifically, Elia recounts, ‘[h]is dreaming fancies had 
transported us beyond the “ignorant present.”’ Like the reader, the passengers on the boat are 
placed temporarily ‘in a new world, with everything unfamiliar about us, and the time and place 
disposed us to the reception of any prodigious marvel whatsoever’ (178-79). In a similar way, 
Lamb’s method as an essayist is to play a delicate game with the trust of his reader. Like the liar 
which his very name evokes, ‘Elia’ dives straight into his reader’s confidence. By doing so, 
however, he does not forfeit trust: in the essay, as on the deck of the boat, there is an implicit 
recognition that the normal rules of social intercourse are suspended.  
 
One might take this further, and suggest that the familiar essay as a genre internalises and 
experiments with the thought that such a ‘leap of faith,’ or act of trust is fundamental to all 
human communication, and not just in the conspicuously groundless conditions of a boat 
expedition, where the subject is all at sea. Hume’s essays in ‘easy’ empiricism and Lamb’s ‘Old 
Margate Hoy’ reject the idea that language is a medium for expressing what we have already 
thought. In reality, they suggest, we never get to construct our thoughts in a kind of empirical 
dry dock; instead, like the essayist, we must first dive into conversation and build our vessel out 
of port. For Hume, the essayist’s task is to steady this vessel, to keep it afloat through the polite 
performance of certain virtues and manners. Lamb’s Elia, on the other hand, is more concerned 
with cultivating a sense of wonder in the spontaneity of the dialogue that floated thought in the 
first place, at the very possibility of a shared experience, amid surmises and semi-consciousness, 
that might count as ‘truth’. Despite their many differences, however, what the writings of Hume 
and Lamb share is an awareness of the way in which the performance of the familiar essayist’s 




It follows from the foregoing that the title of Lamb’s self-consciously unsympathetic essay 
should be treated with caution. Lamb’s essayism does not signal a radical departure from the 
language of trust and intersubjectivity developed by Hume and the thinkers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, an edging out of social empiricism by Romantic idealism. Instead, what both 
Hume and Lamb’s prose writings exhibit is a profound ambivalence towards systematic 
11 
 
philosophy itself. It is this ambivalence that lends the familiar essay in this period its shape and 
its fundamental purpose, creating a space in which formal understanding, aesthetic appreciation 
and social communication overlapped. Seen from this perspective, the conversational, ironic and 
philosophy-deflating Hume and the conversational, ironic and philosophy-ridiculing Lamb had a 
surprising amount in common, not least in the ways that both defied contemporary 
philosophical taxonomies.  
 
Nonetheless, in its idealisation of incompleteness, Lamb’s sympathetically unsympathetic 
broadside against philosophy approximates a concept of aesthetic irony in ways that Hume’s 
does not. At the heart of this irony, as formulated two decades earlier in the Romanticism of the 
Jena circle, is transcendental philosophy’s concern with thought’s presupposition of the 
incomprehensible. This concern is expressed most distinctly by Friedrich Schlegel’s warning, in 
his essay ‘On Incomprehensibility,’ against rationalism: 
 
Yes, even man’s most precious possession, his own inner happiness, depends in the last 
analysis, as anybody can easily verify, on some such point of strength that must be left in 
the dark, but that nonetheless shores up and supports the whole burden and would 
crumble the moment you subjected it to rational analysis. Verily, it would fare badly for 
you if, as you demand, the whole world were ever to become fully comprehensible in 
earnest. (Simpson 185)  
 
In a similar way, the twilight half-knowledge contained in the signature gesture of Lamb’s 
familiar essay is ultimately underwritten by the aestheticisation of the incomprehensible, by what 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy have described as the ‘Literary Absolute’, a 
transcendentally postulated but unattainable unification of subject and object, form and content. 
In theoretical terms, this entailed the idea that literature qua ‘Literature’ might, as pure 
‘generativity,’ compensate for, or even redeem philosophy’s failure to complete itself by figuring 
the absolute productively. In this way, as they put it, ‘[R]omantic thought involves not only the 
absolute of literature, but literature as the absolute. Romanticism is the inauguration of the literary 
absolute’ (12). Such a position, however, as Schlegel himself acknowledged, involved setting out 
from (while by no means remaining in) a fundamentally Kantian understanding of the 




The catch here, of course, is that in Lamb’s writing (as in that of most of his British 
Romantic contemporaries), the labours and rewards of visionary imagination are invoked in the 
absence of transcendental apparatuses and thus a fully theorised account of the work of art itself 
as autotelic. Consequently, while transcendence of empirical, quotidian reality (Elia’s ‘ignorant 
present’) remains tacitly embedded in his writing as a proleptic ideal, the transcendental conditions 
of this goal remain untheorized. In this way, Lamb’s essays said to be both culturally and 
philosophically liminal: not only do they occupy an indeterminate status between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
literature, they also offer an image of the self that brings together an inherited discourse of 
sociability and pragmatic intersubjectivity with a transcendentally idealist conception of aesthetic 
capability that itself remains incomplete. Thus, while for Hume and his Neoclassical literary 
milieu the problem of writing the familiar essay was one of how to ground authority and 
consolidate knowledge in the ‘conversable’ world in the absence of apodictic certainties, the 
challenge facing Lamb and his contemporaries was that of how to privilege the discursive space 
of the essay as ideal and aesthetic without collapsing its numinous aura of enchantment into the 
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i Significantly, until the eighteenth century, the words ‘experience’ and ‘experiment’ are so closely 
associated that they are used more or less synonymously to mean the act of practical, tentative 
trial. Johnson’s Dictionary testifies to this continued intimacy, defining the noun ‘experience’ as ‘1. 
Practice; frequent trial’ and ‘2. Knowledge gained by trial and practice.’ The latter notion of 
experience as practice rather than as phenomena was still current at the time and is in turn associated 
with a heightened awareness of the epistemic role of fictions in discourse. Once epistemological 
relations are redescribed in terms of social relationships, the most pressing questions that arise 
relate to the status of the norms and bonds that regulate the community of knowledge. This 
ultimately produces a concern with what might be considered as the social a priori of knowledge: 
rational accommodation, trust and testimony.  
                                                          
